I’m still trying to wrap my head around the many implications that the June 2025 Rafael Devers trade will have on both the Boston Red Sox and San Francisco MLB franchises. So, here are the facts, various fan base, industry, and media reactions, and my own thoughts.

Financial Implications

The blockbuster trade sending Rafael Devers to San Francisco carries major financial consequences for both franchises. The Giants assume the entirety of Devers’ remaining contract, which is about $250 million through 2033. This 10-year, $313.5M deal (signed in 2023) has an annual luxury-tax hit of roughly $29 million . For San Francisco, that means a significant payroll boost – the club began 2025 around $192M in payroll , and adding Devers’ salary puts them much closer to the Competitive Balance Tax threshold. 

The Giants were willing to take on this “massive financial burden” to land an elite bat . (Notably, Devers even receives a $2M assignment bonus due to the trade, a drop in the bucket relative to the contract’s size.) If the added salary pushes San Francisco over the luxury tax line, they would owe tax penalties. But it appears the front office (led by Buster Posey) deemed the cost worthwhile to “finally [make] the industry-shaking splash” after missing on big free agents. I commend Posey on this move, as while it’s a huge financial investment, Devers is a proven cornerstone bat.

Meanwhile, the Boston Red Sox shed Devers’ enormous contract entirely, achieving immediate cost relief. This move drops Boston’s payroll below the first luxury-tax threshold for 2025 . Red Sox owner John Henry has long been averse to exceeding the CBT (Competitive Balance Tax), and this trade aligns with his philosophy that “big contracts [are] bad business” . By offloading Devers’ ~$31M annual salary, Boston gains significant luxury-tax breathing room and resets their payer status. In fact, the Red Sox are now comfortably under the tax, and there’s little expectation they’ll add much salary at the deadline to change that . The financial flexibility could theoretically be reallocated to other needs – for example, some speculated it “gives them the money to re-sign [Alex] Bregman and give him the world” in a new deal – but based on ownership’s track record, fans are skeptical that the savings will be spent aggressively. I agree with this sentiment.

More importantly, from an organizational perspective, Boston also acquired cost-controlled talent in the deal. Lefty Kyle Harrison is a 23-year-old making the league minimum, and the prospects (James Tibbs and José Bello) will be years from arbitration. Veteran reliever Jordan Hicks is signed through 2027 at $12.5 million per season. In essence, the Red Sox exchanged a long-term, high-AAV commitment for younger, cheaper players under team control, aligning with a retooling strategy and avoiding future luxury-tax liabilities.

Player Statistics and Performance Trends

This blockbuster trade involves one established star (Devers) and a package of pitchers/prospects. Let’s examine each player’s recent performance and trajectory:

Rafael Devers (3B/DH, 28) – A three-time All-Star in his prime, Devers has been one of baseball’s top left-handed sluggers. In 2024, he continued to produce at a high level (around an .871 OPS, 28 HR) despite subpar defense (he ranked last among third basemen in Defensive Runs Saved in 2023-24) . Transitioning to full-time DH in 2025 seems to have unlocked his bat: at the time of the trade Devers is hitting .279/.349/.509 for his career, marks he’s exceeding in 2025. Through mid-June 2025, he posted a 145 wRC+ (a career-best) despite a sluggish April . After working back from a spring shoulder injury, Devers caught fire – since May 1, he’s logged an even more torrid 170 wRC+, making him a top-10 hitter in MLB in that span. That surge included serving as Boston’s “hottest hitter” just before the trade , even hitting a homer in his final Red Sox at-bat. 

With three 30+ HR seasons already under his belt, Devers provides the Giants with the kind of middle-of-the-order power they’ve lacked. San Francisco hasn’t had a 30-HR hitter since Barry Bonds. The key trend to watch is whether Devers can maintain elite offensive production as a primary DH. His 2025 numbers suggest he’s thriving offensively without the wear of playing the field, but the Giants will be counting on his “bat to remain among the best in the league” for years to come to justify the huge contract outlay .

Jordan Hicks (RHP, 28) – In Hicks, the Red Sox receive a power pitcher with a perplexing performance record. A former Cardinals closer known for 100+ mph velocity, Hicks signed with San Francisco to attempt converting into a starter in 2024. The experiment yielded mixed results. Hicks has oscillated between the rotation and bullpen, and his surface stats are rough: a 6.47 ERA over 48⅔ innings this season . However, advanced metrics tell a different story – his FIP is just 3.59, indicating far better underlying performance (strong strikeout rate, reduced walks) than his ERA shows . In fact, analysts noted his “fantastic peripherals” amid the bloated ERA , suggesting bad luck or poor defense behind him in San Francisco. 

By June 2025, Hicks had lost his rotation spot and was on the injured list with a minor arm issue. Boston is likely to deploy Hicks out of the bullpen, where he has much more experience. If healthy, he could slot in as a late-inning power arm – essentially filling the right-handed closer/setup role to complement lefty Aroldis Chapman, which Boston had sought all offseason . Hicks’ trend is one of underperformance relative to his talent; the Red Sox hope a role reset and new environment help him return to his strong 2022-23 form (when he was a high-leverage reliever). Under contract only through 2027, Hicks is a relatively low-risk gamble for Boston’s needy pitching staff. 

Personally, I think a return to the pen will revitalize his career, but relievers are highly volatile. His is also the only meaningful salary they are taking on, but it’s not like he’s washed up. Jordan Hicks’ Statcast page offers some further good signs: he’s in the 89th percentile in limiting “barrels” and is in the 96th percentile in groundball rate with a whopping 58.7 percent. He’s still a perfectly good pitcher who can give you multiple innings in relief.

Kyle Harrison (LHP, 23) – Harrison is the linchpin of the return package, a highly touted young pitcher who was San Francisco’s top pitching prospect. A hard-throwing lefty with a strikeout-heavy profile, Harrison made his MLB debut late in 2024 and opened 2025 in the Giants’ rotation. In four MLB starts for San Francisco this year, he posted a 4.91 ERA (4.22 FIP) across 18⅓ innings . Those numbers reflect a rookie going through growing pains – flashes of dominance (11.3 K/9 in that span, per reports) tempered by bouts of wildness and a few big innings. 

Upon being traded, Harrison was immediately optioned to Triple-A Worcester to continue refining his game . Scouts view him as a long-term starter with “high-upside” potential . He will likely get chances in Boston soon if the MLB rotation falters. Harrison’s recent trend includes an up-and-down transition to the majors, but his minor-league track record (career 14+ K/9 in the minors) and top-prospect pedigree suggest a bright future. Boston will be patient as he develops; his arrival injects youth and upside into a pitching staff that, outside of a couple veterans, “struggled to find much stability” in 2025. Basically, Harrison’s performance trend is that of a talented young arm adjusting to big-league hitters – the Red Sox will work to unlock his front-of-rotation potential.

Like Hicks, Statcast shows some promising trends for Kyle Harrison in his limited MLB action so far. He has above average fastball velocity paired with 75th percentile extension, meaning his fastball “jumps” on hitters far more than average. This would explain his solid 28.3% whiff rate and 25% strikeout rate in those four MLB starts and four relief appearances in 2025. If he pans out to even be a league-average starting pitcher, this will be a nice get for Boston.

James Tibbs III (OF/1B prospect, 22) – Tibbs is an advanced hitting prospect and was San Francisco’s first-round pick in 2024 . In his first full pro season (2025), he’s already impressing. At High-A Eugene, Tibbs owns a .245 batting average but a robust .377 OBP and .480 SLG . That line features excellent plate discipline – nearly as many walks as strikeouts – and solid power production (10 homers in ~60 games). His approach was his calling card in college at Florida State, where he put up a video-game stat line (.363/.488/.777 with 23 HR in 66 games) . 

Boston brass are high on Tibbs’ above-average hit and power tools, praising his swing decisions and mature bat . After the trade, Tibbs was ranked the Red Sox’ #4 prospect (he had been SF’s #4) and could be on a fast track if he continues to mash. He’s primarily played outfield, but also has seen time at first base; Boston values that flexibility given their future needs. Projection-wise, Tibbs profiles as a middle-of-the-order bat if development goes well. Of course, he’s likely a couple years away – reaching Double-A will be his next test. In terms of trend, Tibbs is “looking excellent” in the low minors so far, validating his first-round status , and the Red Sox will closely monitor whether his patient, powerful approach carries forward against higher-level pitching.

I will play devil’s advocate here because FanGraphs is nowhere as high on him. The FanGraphs prospect guys see Tibbs as a future platoon outfielder because of issues hitting lefties. Of course, that was in the 2025 preseason and he’s mashed since then. However, the Red Sox are assigning him to Double-A Portland after the trade, so maybe they see something that FanGraphs didn’t. It also helps that before the trade, Tibbs was mashing lefties at a .316/.458/.553 clip. But that is only High-A ball. Here I see the guy that the Sox are hoping becomes a Devers-lite, even if he needs a platoon partner.

José Bello (RHP prospect, 20) – The second prospect in the deal, Bello is more of a lottery ticket. Signed out of the Dominican Republic in 2023, he is a raw arm who only recently came stateside. In a brief sample in rookie ball, Bello has racked up 41.8% strikeouts (28 K in 18 IP) with a high-90s fastball – eye-popping numbers regardless of level . However, he’s very early in his development (only 18 innings pitched in official games). Not ranked among the Giants’ top prospects (and now unranked for Boston), Bello nonetheless has drawn whispers as a potential high-leverage reliever down the line if his command and secondary pitches improve. At 6’3” with a projectable frame and big strikeout ability, he’s a classic high-upside, high-variance prospect. The recent trend is simply that he’s healthy and missing bats in complex-league action. 

For Boston’s farm system, Bello becomes a name to watch in the lower rungs – a “high-upside talent” infusion for a system that had been thinned by recent graduations and trades . Realistically, he won’t factor into the majors for several years, but if all goes well, the Red Sox might unearth a future bullpen weapon. In summary, Bello’s performance to date is limited but tantalizing, defined by extreme strikeout prowess against rookie-ball competition. FanGraphs saw him as “a high-floored backend starter type” in the 2025 preseason prospect reports. If he even becomes a good bullpen arm, I think he’s a good get.

Reactions from Analysts, Fans, and Team Leadership

Shock and Surprise in the Baseball World: The trade of Rafael Devers in June – over a month before the deadline – stunned many observers. It was widely described as a “shocking mid-June blockbuster” that “took the baseball world completely by surprise.” Even within the Red Sox clubhouse, the timing was jolting: Devers was pulled off the team plane after a road sweep of the Yankees as news of the deal broke . National analysts and baseball insiders immediately recognized the magnitude. 

MLB Trade Rumors called it “a stunning move” with massive implications for both franchises . Many noted the irony that Boston – a large-market team – was trading its homegrown star while still in contention (37-36 and just a game over .500 at the time) . ESPN’s Jeff Passan reported on the key detail that tempered the lopsided appearance: San Francisco taking on the full contract . Still, the consensus among media was that this was an extraordinary trade rarely seen from a club like Boston. As the Providence Journal put it, “The Red Sox aren’t supposed to ship out club cornerstones…this is the kind of trade reserved for lesser franchises.” That biting commentary captures the shock turning into outrage in New England sports media. 

While this trade is immensely upsetting to me, it means that the Red Sox saw Devers as an asset at the peak of his value. As a defensively-limited player with a quarter-billion dollars owed over the next eight years, the Boston brass saw an opportunity to just give him away. Remember the last time the Red Sox did a huge salary dump, they won the World Series the next year. As a purely data-driven move, it actually makes sense for both sides, especially for the Giants who need a lineup anchor.

Criticism of Red Sox Leadership: Reactions in Boston’s media and fan base were largely negative, focusing on the team’s direction and the return. Local columnists lambasted ownership and the front office. The Providence Journal’s take was scathing – calling the trade a move driven by John Henry’s aversion to high salaries at the expense of competitiveness, and accusing new Chief Baseball Officer Craig Breslow of making the team worse in the short term.

The trade occurred less than two years after Devers was signed to the largest contract in franchise history, leading to questions of organizational competence: “There was a clear communication breakdown between Breslow…and what was supposed to be his franchise player,” one writer noted, describing the situation as an “avoidable” fiasco. (I do agree this was handled poorly from a PR perspective.) Boston’s front office tried to frame the deal as a painful but necessary step. Breslow (and team president Sam Kennedy) addressed media on a Zoom call, emphasizing the long-term benefits of the move – namely, pitching depth and resetting the payroll for future flexibility . “This is about the future of the club,” Breslow insisted, implicitly arguing that adding two big arms and two prospects would help “sustain success for the long term” even if it hurt 2025. 

Manager Alex Cora was left to handle the clubhouse aftermath; he reportedly gathered the team to reassure them they could still compete without their best hitter . Cora himself came under some criticism for not resolving the Devers situation internally before it reached a breaking point, but most blame from fans fell on ownership’s lack of commitment. Indeed, Red Sox fans on talk radio and social media erupted – the prevailing sentiment was frustration, even betrayal. 

Many cited this as the latest in a string of star offloads (Mookie Betts, Xander Bogaerts) and saw it as waving a white flag on the season. As the Journal put it, “the immediate losers…are the fans”, who have watched beloved stars leave and now face another reset. As Over The Monster put it,  this is less about a prospect for a proven star swap than it’s about Boston closing the Betts-Devers era. They write, “this was always going to be how it ended”—a capstone to years of front-office dysfunction. 

Devers’ Camp and Clubhouse Perspective: It’s worth noting that Devers himself was reportedly not unhappy with the outcome. Despite not formally requesting a trade, friends of Devers said he was “pleased with the change of scenery” . The relationship between Devers and the Red Sox had deteriorated over months of public and private discord. His open refusal to play first base after Triston Casas’ injury – and his quote to the media (“they should do their jobs…hit the market and look for another player” to fill in at 1B) – painted the picture of a rift between Devers and the Boston brass . Many teammates were aware of the tension. 

Some insiders believe that trading an “unhappy star” could actually improve the Red Sox clubhouse morale going forward . In other words, once it became clear Devers was disgruntled and not fully bought in, moving him might remove a distraction. Red Sox leadership implicitly echoed this: according to one report, team sources felt that a $313M player needed to “do what’s right for the team and [Devers] did not live up to that,” and thus a parting was justified. 

Still, that doesn’t make the pill less bitter for fans who had embraced Devers as the face of the franchise post-Betts. On social platforms, Boston fans overwhelmingly vented at ownership – accusing Henry of cheapness and the front office of getting an inadequate return. The return package was a hot topic: while Harrison and Tibbs have promise, many felt it was “light for a player of Devers’ caliber,” essentially “money saved” being the main gain . A poll on one Boston sports radio site showed a majority of fans grading the trade an “F” for Boston.

From a PR perspective, this trade absolutely is an “F.” The return is a “D-plus” at best and to be any better than that requires Hicks to slot in at a high-leverage reliever and succeed, Harrison to be a useful rotation arm over the next several seasons, Tibbs to be a strong lefty bat (even if he ends up being the strong side of a platoon), and Bello to at least provide some innings at some point. The salary relief cannot be understated. Personally, I don’t view this trade as negatively as some because I think the return is significant considering the magnitude of salary shed.

San Francisco Reactions: In the Bay Area, the mood was the polar opposite – a mix of excitement and relief. Giants fans woke up to the news almost in disbelief that their team had landed a bona fide star via trade. After years of near-misses in free agency, the narrative was that San Francisco finally got an elite hitter to build around . The fact that ownership was willing to absorb the huge contract was seen as a statement of intent to win. Media coverage in San Francisco highlighted the front-office boldness of Buster Posey (President of Baseball Ops) in making this deal. The Giants were 41-30 and in a tight NL West race at the time of the trade; Posey’s move was viewed as a vote of confidence in the team’s 2025 chances. 

As MLB Trade Rumors noted, adding a bat of Devers’ caliber to a middling Giants offense was a “virtual no-brainer”, especially since the pitchers they gave up were not major contributors to the 2025 team and the prospects were years away . Some Giants commentators did acknowledge the financial risk – that paying Devers $30M a year into his mid-30s could backfire if his production wanes . But many compared it to the alternatives: if the Giants couldn’t sign a Judge or Ohtani in free agency, trading for a locked-up star was a savvy alternative. 

Even rival fans admitted the Giants “aren’t messing around” – one MLBTR commenter quipped that Devers’ contract “may look ugly in a few years, but right now he’s an elite hitter and the Giants needed to do something big” . In summary, the prevailing reaction in San Francisco was positive: analysts saw the trade as the Giants aggressively seizing a rare opportunity to acquire a prime-age slugger, and fans were energized by the move despite the hefty price tag. The Dodgers’ fanbase, meanwhile, took notice – as one media headline suggested, “I’ll bet the Dodgers are a little nervous…Giants finally landed a star” .

I love this trade for the Giants. They get Devers at a bit of a discount salary-wise thanks to dumping Hicks (who I like but they can finally move on from their failed converted starter experiment.) Harrison could be a darn good pitcher, but you’ll take Devers next eight seasons over his any day. Tibbs may be a future, cheaper Devers who can play first base and corner outfield if necessary. Bello is just a nice lottery ticket. But where the Giants are right now, most certainly contending, Devers is a massive boost for them. That’s a more than accessible loss for that much team control on what now looks like a market discount deal for a bat of Devers’ calibre.

Historical Comparisons

Big trades involving a star position player exchanged for a package of pitchers and prospects are relatively rare, but there are notable precedents. Baseball history offers several blockbuster swaps that invite comparison to the Devers deal – both in structure and in how they panned out for the teams involved:

• Mookie Betts to Dodgers (2020): In a move that Red Sox fans now bitterly recall, Boston traded former MVP Mookie Betts (along with David Price’s contract) to Los Angeles before the 2020 season. In return Boston received Alex Verdugo (an MLB outfielder) and prospects Jeter Downs and Connor Wong. The context was similar – Boston ownership’s insistence on staying under the luxury tax led to dealing a franchise star for a prospect package. The outcome has been lopsided: Betts immediately helped the Dodgers win a World Series in 2020, has been an All-Star every year since, and remains an elite player. Boston’s haul, meanwhile, yielded mixed results. Verdugo became a solid everyday player, but Downs fizzled out (released after 2022) and Wong is a role player. The Betts trade drew heavy criticism as a pure salary dump, and in many ways set the stage for the Devers saga – Boston’s fan base had been told Devers would be the homegrown star to build around after Betts’ exit. Trading Devers now, in 2025, is viewed as “history repeating itself,” further eroding trust in Red Sox ownership. Like the Devers deal, the Betts trade shows how a team’s financial priorities can reshape the roster, and it serves as a cautionary tale: the Red Sox suffered reputational damage and on-field decline post-Betts , a fate they risk again after moving Devers. The difference here: Betts only had one year of team control left.
  
• Miguel Cabrera to Tigers (2007): A classic example of a superstar-for-prospects blockbuster. The rebuilding Florida Marlins traded 24-year-old Miguel Cabrera – already a superstar third baseman – (plus pitcher Dontrelle Willis) to Detroit for a package of six prospects, including pitchers Andrew Miller, Burke Badenhop, Eulogio De La Cruz and Dallas Trahern, and outfielder Cameron Maybin. Outcome: Detroit decisively “won” this trade – Cabrera became a two-time MVP with the Tigers and anchored their lineup for a decade, while most of the Marlins’ touted prospects never panned out . Miller and Maybin, the headliners, struggled in Florida (though Miller later reinvented himself as a reliever elsewhere – and actually pitched for Boston at one point). In hindsight, it’s overwhelmingly clear that acquiring the Hall-of-Fame-bound Cabrera was worth the prospect cost for Detroit . For Miami, it’s remembered as a franchise-defining salary dump that failed to return equivalent value. The Devers trade has parallels: a star 3B in his prime dealt for prospects, and one team assuming a huge contract. Boston hopes to avoid Miami’s fate in this analogy – the Marlins’ haul was considered strong at the time, but it “always looked lopsided” in retrospect because Cabrera kept performing at a Hall of Fame level . If Devers goes on to have eight All-Star caliber seasons in San Francisco, the Giants won’t care who those prospects were. The Cabrera example is a reminder that trading an elite hitter not yet 30 can haunt a franchise for years if the youngsters don’t blossom.
  
• Josh Donaldson to Blue Jays (2014): In November 2014, the Oakland A’s shocked the baseball world by trading All-Star 3B Josh Donaldson to Toronto for a four-player package. Oakland received infielder Brett Lawrie and three young players (pitchers Kendall Graveman and Sean Nolin, plus shortstop prospect Franklin Barreto). This was another instance of a small-market team swapping a star position player for mostly pitchers/prospects. Outcome: Toronto reaped huge rewards, as Donaldson won AL MVP in 2015 and led the Blue Jays to consecutive ALCS appearances. For Oakland, the return proved “very underwhelming for a player of Donaldson’s caliber” . Lawrie was a mediocre contributor for one year, Graveman became a back-end starter, and Barreto never developed into the star Oakland had hoped. The A’s essentially flipped Donaldson for quantity over quality, and it didn’t yield a cornerstone – a result Boston surely hopes to avoid with the Devers return. Observers at the time argued Oakland’s motivation was financial (Donaldson was due a raise in arbitration, similar to Devers’ contract motivating Boston) . The trade was widely panned as Oakland “selling low” on an MVP-caliber player . In retrospect, it’s seen as a big win for Toronto and a misfire for the A’s. The Donaldson deal shows that even when a star is traded for multiple pieces, talent imbalance can be glaring if none of the pieces approach the star’s impact. Boston’s package for Devers – Harrison, Hicks, Tibbs, Bello – will face the same scrutiny; if none become stars, the trade will be judged harshly, much like Oakland’s.
  
• Paul Goldschmidt to Cardinals (2018): The Arizona Diamondbacks dealt face-of-the-franchise Paul Goldschmidt (an All-Star first baseman) to St. Louis in exchange for pitcher Luke Weaver, catcher Carson Kelly, infielder Andy Young, and a draft pick. This trade is analogous as a star position player for a prospect package headlined by young pitchers (Weaver was a former first-round pitcher). Outcome: Decidedly in St. Louis’s favor. Goldschmidt continued to excel – he won the NL MVP in 2022 with the Cardinals. True, “Goldy” regressed in 2023 and 2024, but he was still a valuable player, although he’s been much more productive for the Yankees in 2025. Meanwhile, Arizona’s return has yielded little long-term value: Weaver had a few average seasons before being traded away, Kelly was a middling catcher (since replaced), and none of the pieces became stars. Four years on, evaluations noted the trade “hasn’t aged particularly well for the Diamondbacks” . The D-backs essentially acknowledged a mini-rebuild by trading Goldy, similar to Boston moving Devers for future pieces. The Cardinals, on the other hand, viewed Goldschmidt as that missing big bat – akin to the Giants’ view of Devers. This comparison underscores the risk for the team trading the star: Arizona hoped their young return would “set them up well for the future,” but it didn’t materialize . Boston will aim for a better outcome – perhaps Harrison becomes a frontline starter or Tibbs a middle-order hitter – but Goldschmidt’s case shows how hard it is to get equal value for an established superstar. The upside for the Giants is that, like St. Louis did, they acquired an elite hitter who could anchor their lineup into his mid-30s. The downside for Boston is the possibility that none of the return matches Devers’ impact, echoing Arizona’s regret.
  
• Mark Teixeira to Braves (2007): A notable blockbuster where the prospect package actually paid off. The Texas Rangers traded star first baseman Mark Teixeira (age 27) to Atlanta at the 2007 deadline for five players, notably three young pitchers (Neftali Feliz, Matt Harrison) and one blue-chip position prospect (Elvis Andrus) . Atlanta was buying a slugger for a playoff push, while Texas sold high to rebuild. Outcome: This trade ended up a win-win (but mostly for Texas). Teixeira performed brilliantly for the Braves (.956 OPS in 2007 stretch run) , yet Atlanta didn’t make the postseason and Tex left after 2008. The Rangers, however, hit the jackpot with the prospects: Andrus became a two-time All-Star shortstop, Feliz won Rookie of the Year as an All-Star closer, and Harrison developed into an 18-game-winning All-Star starter . Those three were key in Texas reaching the World Series in 2010 and 2011 . In hindsight, trading Tex enabled a franchise turnaround for Texas, proving that a haul of prospects can blossom into multiple core players. The Braves got a year and a half of Teixeira’s prime (which they later flipped to the Angels for Casey Kotchman), essentially sacrificing future talent for a short-term rental. This serves as a contrast to other examples: the selling team (Texas) maximized their return. Boston undoubtedly studied such history – their hope is to replicate what Texas did, turning a star into a nucleus of young talent. As one MLB.com retrospective noted, “when teams in ‘sell’ mode cash in on assets for prospects, sometimes those prospects blossom at precisely the right time” . The Red Sox are betting that Harrison, Bello, or Tibbs will be their Andrus/Feliz/Harrison equivalent in a few years. The Teixeira trade is a best-case scenario for a prospect package outcome, whereas the others above (Betts, Cabrera, Donaldson, Goldschmidt) skew towards the team acquiring the star. This highlights the central risk-reward of the Devers trade: Boston sacrificed an elite player (in his prime, under contract) for future pieces – if those pieces flourish, the trade can be justified, but if they don’t, Boston will have dealt away a star for pennies on the dollar, a result that fans and historians won’t soon forget .
  

So, we can see historically, these sorts of trades don’t pan out well at all. The Betts trade continues to be mocked as Mookie looks to retire in Dodger Blue and wear an LA cap on his Hall of Fame plaque. The Marlins, Athletics, and Diamondbacks still rue those blockbuster trades, too. The chances this trade works out as well as the Teixeira swap did for the Rangers is probably around one-in-five, and that means at least one player from those three prospects becoming a star with the other two being contributors. Anything you get from Hicks is gravy.

As for the Red Sox ownership being cheap, it seems the Boston ownership values Alex Bregman more highly than Devers. They also want to open up at-bats for star prospect Roman Anthony and for Masataka Yoshida upon his 2025 return. But more importantly, it gets them under the Competitive Balance Tax. Remember, the Red Sox have always functioned this way since the luxury tax came into being. They only go over the thresholds when they see the need. Red Sox Nation should’ve seen this coming. I certainly did, just not in June! 

The only way this trade ends up looking good for the Red Sox is if Devers steeply declines after age thirty. I don’t think they made this move just to trade an unhappy star, especially not one who is essentially your franchise player. The problem is, while they’ve been fantastic at moving massive future commitments, they’ve never been particularly good at getting good returns in those swaps. This swap of an eight-year contract of such magnitude, though, is incredibly unprecedented. This is going to be a storyline I revisit at the end of the 2025 season, and probably every season going forward… it’s that historic of a trade!

Thanks to MLB Trade Rumors, Sports Illustrated, Providence Journal, Front Office Sports, ESPN, MLB.com, FanGraphs/Statistical references .